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Abstract 
 
This paper uses insights from labour-market segmentation theory to investigate the 
wage differences between part-time and full-time workers in Germany at different 
parts of the wage distribution. This is accomplished with the use of a quintile 
regression and panel data from the SOEP (1991-2008). To get more insight on the 
part-time wage-gap, we apply a counterfactual wage decomposition analysis. The 
results show that, in the lower end of the wage distribution, part-time workers receive 
lower returns for their labour market characteristics, indicating the segmentation of 
the labour market. In contrast, at the top of the wage distribution, the part-time wage 
gap is fully explained by the difference in the characteristics of part-timers and full-
timers.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The rapid growth of part-time employment in Europe the last 30 years has come as a 
response to the need of employers for more flexibility but also, to a certain extent, to 
the need of workers for life-work balance reconciliation. At the positive side, part-
time employment is associated with a large increase in female labour force 
participation. At the negative side, part-time employment may come at a cost as 
personal resources remain partly unutilized and investments in human capital are 
reduced for part-timers. This results in a well-known part-time wage penalty (Blank, 
1990; Dekker, Muffels, & Stancanelli, 2000; Gornick & Jacobs, 1996; Manning & 
Petrongolo, 2008; OECD, 1999; Russo & Hassink, 2008).  
The aforementioned considerations for part-time employment become more 
relevant for countries with rigid labour markets, such as Germany. In these countries, 
part-time employment, as a form of atypical employment, carries a more negative 
connotation and thus, a stigma for the worker. In the last decades, Germany has been 
on a gradual path to make its labour market more flexible (Hevenstone, 2010). The 
result of this process is that the incidence of part-time employment in Germany is 
among the highest within OECD countries. Specifically, in 2009, 8% of the German 
male workers and 38.1% of the female workers was employed part-time (OECD, 
2010). Despite the legislative efforts to equalize the rights of part-time workers with 
full-time workers, the former face a 6% wage penalty compared to their full-time 
colleagues (McGinnity & McManus, 2007).  
The average wage penalty, however, ignores the fact that part-time work is 
very heterogeneous. This heterogeneity stems from the fact that part-time employment 
encompasses both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs: skilled workers and professionals next to 
workers in low-wage and low-status jobs (Kahne, 1992). An approach that considers 
average effects treats equally a low-wage cleaner with a highly paid advisor that both 
work part time. This heterogeneity is only partly taken away when, as most studies do, 
controlling for human capital and job characteristics. Previous research has shown 
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that, even within jobs and within groups of individuals with similar skill levels, part-
time work differs considerably according to several characteristics such as the type of 
the employment contract, the number of working hours, the position in the workplace, 
the strength of the trade unions and the preferences of the employer (Barling & 
Gallagher, 1996; Jenkins, 2004; O'Reilly & Fagan, 1998; Walsh & Deery, 1999). 
These considerations are even more valid for Germany as, in the absence of a 
statutory minimum wage, there are sometimes different wage regulations for workers 
in the same occupation and with the same characteristics.  
Regardless of the exact source of the heterogeneity of part-time work, the 
result is that in a good-quality part-time job the worker is highly remunerated, while 
in a bad-quality part-time job, he receives a low wage. Therefore, the wage level can 
serve as a good proxy that encompasses the characteristics that describe the quality of 
the part-time job. Wahlberg (2008) offers some preliminary evidence for Sweden that 
that the part-time wage-gap differs across pay levels. However, this research is far 
from being complete, while it has not been carried out in other countries. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the part-time wage-gap across the wage 
distribution in Germany. To distinguish between net wage differences that are 
attributed to part-time employment and wage differences that emerge due to the 
different composition of full-timers and part-timers, we employ a counterfactual 
decomposition on a quintile regression (Machado & Mata, 2005; Melly, 2007).  
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 gives an overview of relevant 
theoretical considerations. Section 3 introduces the importance of the socio-economic 
context and proceeds to summarize the main facts in the German labour market and 
their effect on the wage levels of part-time workers. Section 4 outlines the data and 
the method used in this study. The results of the subsequent analysis with additional 
robustness tests are presented in section 5. The conclusions of the paper as well as the 
possible relevance of the main findings to future research and social policy are 
discussed in section 6. 
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2. Theoretical considerations 
The part-time pay gap is typically explained by economic theoretical approaches such 
as the human capital theory and the theory on quasi-fixed costs and by sociological 
theories, such as preferences theory and the gender role model (Biddle & Thomas, 
1966; Hakim, 2007; Tijdens, 2002).  However, the standard considerations of these 
theories cannot account for differences in the part-time pay gap that emerge between 
different parts of the wage distribution. To explain these differences, we have to turn 
to labour market segmentation theories. 
Theories on labour market segmentation may play an important role in 
explaining the part-time wage-gap (Aaronson & French, 2004; Ermisch & Wright, 
1992; Hardoy & Schøne, 2006; Jepsen, O’Dorchai, Plasman, & Rycx, 2005; Rodgers, 
2004; Wolf, 2002). Here, we complement these theories with considerations from the 
theory on quasi-fixed costs to derive hypotheses on the variation of the part-time 
wage-gap across the wage distribution.  
2.1. Segmentation theories 
Labour market segmentation theories (see e.g. Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Edwards, 
1979) suggest that the labour market is divided into two segments that differ in terms 
of job quality, remuneration and employment stability. In the primary segment, 
workers enjoy good working conditions, job or employment stability, high wages and 
good promotion opportunities. In contrast, in the secondary segment, precarious jobs 
with low security, low wages and scarce promotion opportunities are widespread.  
Segmentation theories are relevant in explaining heterogeneity in part-time 
employment. Tilly (1991, 1992; 1996) and Walsh (1999) suggest the existence of a 
dualism in part-time employment. Specifically, they make a distinction between 
retention and secondary part-time jobs. Good or retention part-time jobs are created to 
keep a company’s valued, mostly skilled employees, whose life circumstances prevent 
them from working full-time. One could add here the high-skilled part-time jobs that 
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cover specific and usually temporary needs of companies (i.e. advisors).  Retention 
part-time jobs are located in the primary labour market and are occupied voluntarily 
by workers. Bad or secondary part-time jobs that outnumber the retention part-time 
jobs are found in the secondary segment of the labour market. One could argue that 
workers are employed involuntarily in these jobs. However, as the preferences theory 
or the role theory would suggest, this may not be the case. Many workers – mostly 
females – that are second breadwinners in the household, may value less the wage and 
the working conditions and accept such a part-time job. Therefore, part-time 
employment has a very different function at the two ends of the wage distribution. In 
low-wage jobs, part-time work serves as an indicator of the secondary segment of the 
labour market. In contrast, in high-paid jobs, part-time work is less of an indicator of 
the labour market segment. 
In more detail, dual labour market theory maintains that part-time jobs are 
concentrated more in the secondary labour market making them more vulnerable 
(Hagen, 2002). The growth of part-time employment has occurred in the context of 
globalization, outsourcing and the subsequent change in employers’ labour-use 
strategies, e.g. adjusting to business cycles (Buddelmeyer, 2008). In companies with a 
low technology base and high dependence on the fluctuation in market demand, a 
small number of ‘core’, full-time workers is needed to keep the company going, while 
production/service delivery could be managed by atypical employment (Lambert, 
2008). Such part-time jobs are usually covered by population subgroups with poor 
labour market integration, such as female workers and immigrants. Workers from 
such groups typically have lower negotiation power and receive lower wages 
(Ermisch & Wright, 1992).  
A different picture emerges in the primary sector of the labour market. In this 
sector, many firms, especially in the public sector, are responsive to the needs of 
workers for less working hours (Tijdens, 2002). These firms adjust their labour use 
strategies according to part-time work and thus, no part-time wage gap emerges. 
Moreover, in high-paid jobs in dynamic, innovative firms – e.g. ICT companies – that 
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require specific skills flexible working hours may be encouraged (Boockmann & 
Hagen, 2001). Hiring high-paid experts for specific tasks on a part-time basis would 
be an opportunity for the firm to minimize the overall costs as there may not be 
enough work for a full-timer. In this case, the firm may offer even a higher hourly 
wage to the part-time expert than to his full-time colleague.  Therefore, in such jobs 
there is no reason for a part-time wage-gap to exist.  
2.2. Labour demand theory and quasi-fixed costs 
The relationship between the working hours and the hourly wage is affected by the 
quasi-fixed costs that are related to paid employment and by the fluctuating levels of 
productivity during the working day. These costs are related to hiring, training, 
administrating, coordinating and monitoring workers, as well as to the ‘start-up’ effect 
and the ‘fatigue effect’ (Barzel, 1973; Gregory, 2010). If these costs are high, it 
becomes preferable for employers to hire people on full-time capacity and with a 
higher wage instead of relying on part-time workers (Montgomery, 1988).  
Quasi-fixed costs are typically higher for high-skilled and high-paid jobs. 
Costs related to hiring and initial training are much higher for high-skilled – and 
therefore high-paid – jobs than for low-skilled jobs. Coordination costs are also higher 
for managerial jobs than for low-paid jobs. Employing part-time managers would be 
too expensive for companies as this would require an increased investment in hiring 
and training as well as inefficiency due to the supervision of full-time workers by 
part-time managers. If such managers are indeed hired, companies may compensate 
for the high fixed costs by offering them a lower wage (Rosen, 1976).  
With the face of Janus, the argument reverses when we focus on the other end 
of the wage distribution: the lower the associated quasi-fixed costs of employing 
workers, the more preferable it is to employ part-time workers if that can be achieved 
at a lower cost. The theory of quasi-fixed costs would suggest that low-paid jobs are 
mainly simple, unskilled jobs where hardly any fixed costs apply while high-paid jobs 
are skilled jobs with many related fixed costs.  Thus, according to quasi-fixed costs, 
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we expect the part-time wage-gap to be smaller at the lower end of the wage 
distribution. Consequently, we expect different effects of part-time employment on 
wages at the different parts of the wage distribution. 
3. Socio-economic context and the German labour market 
The upsurge of part-time employment has been connected to the growing needs for 
flexibility, especially in times of uncertainty (O'Reilly & Fagan, 1998). However, 
working-hours supply is also influenced by institutional factors: employment 
protection, tax incentives, availability of child care and elderly-care provision (Gash, 
2008; Schmid, 2010).  
Germany is an example of a corporatist welfare state in the typology of 
Esping-Andersen (1990) or a coordinated market economy (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 39) 
with cooperative capital-labour relations and bargained moderation in wage setting 
(Ebner, 2010). Already after the II World War the German labour market headed for 
the ‘Normalarbeitsverhältnis,’ i.e. the standard employment relationship: full-time job 
with protection against dismissal, status protection and most importantly collective 
wage setting well above the subsistence level (for an overview of German 
employment model, see Eichhorst, 2011). The German labour market tightly links 
educational credentials with job requirements (Gangl, 2004; Gangl, Müller, & Raffe, 
2003). Educational credentials and labour market experience account for a large part 
of the earnings progression over the life cycle (Trappe & Rosenfeld, 1998). The 
German labour market is a typical ‘insiders’ labour market, where ‘core’ workers in 
the primary segment enjoy a high level of job protection and higher wages, while their 
counterparts in the secondary segment are much less protected and much more 
exposed to atypical employment (Giesecke, 2009). Long-term and full-time 
employment relations are typical for the primary segment of the labour market, while 
flexible contracts and part-time employment are widespread in the secondary 
segment.  
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 In the last 20 years, developments in the German labour market have 
strengthened some of the aforementioned characteristics. As employment protection 
remained high, employers turned to internal flexibility arrangements, with part-time 
work having a leading role (Keller & Seifert, 2005). Restrictions for atypical 
employment started to be lifted in the 1990s. Consequently, between 1992 and 2006, 
part-time work in West Germany grew over 80%, while full-time employment 
decreased by 15% (Klinger & Wolf, 2011). Furthermore, recent labour market 
reforms in Germany, such as the Hartz reforms and the creation of ‘mini-jobs’ in the 
2000s, have been associated with the expansion of regular part-time work (Schmid & 
Modrack, 2008), but also with the sharp increase of part-time work in the unregulated 
and low-wage section of the labour market (Bosch & Kalina, 2008;  for an overview 
of state reforms regarding low paid work see Caliendoa & Wrohlichb, 2010; 
Eichhorst, 2011; Palier & Thelen, 2010). Since the early 1990’s, a wage-gap for part-
timers emerged. In the mid-1990s, the median hourly earnings of part-time workers 
were only 83% of the full-time equivalent  (OECD, 1999). Despite this rise, the part-
time pay gap in Germany remains lower than in other countries. For instance, 
Manning & Petrongolo (2008) suggest that this gap in 25% in the UK, while 
McGinnity & McManus  (2007) find a 6%  gap in Germany.  
 The relatively low part-time wage gap in Germany may be explained by wage 
regulations and legislation about equal treatment of part-timers. However, the fact that 
collective bargaining does not cover workers universally in most sectors may actually 
explain why this part-time wage gap exists. More specifically, in Germany, there is no 
statutory minimum wage. Nevertheless, collective bargaining sets minimum pay 
arrangements for the covered firms (Bosch & Weinkopf, 2010). In addition, binding 
minimum wages are set in some economic branches and occupations, such as 
construction, electrical work, janitors, roofers and painters. Minimum pay regulation 
affects merely the wages of the low paid, while also equalizes the hourly 
compensation between the low-paid part-timers and full-timers. The result is that both 
the level of the wage of low-paid part-timers and the wage difference between low-
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paid part-timers and low-paid full-timers may vary within the same sector as some 
firms are covered by collective bargaining while others are not.  
3.1. Hypotheses 
The theoretical framework and specific characteristics of the German labour market 
suggest that the wage-gap between part-time and full-time workers varies between the 
different parts of the wage distribution and that this wage-gap cannot be fully 
explained by differences in socio-demographic or employment related characteristics 
between full-timers and part-timers (hypothesis 1). Contradicting hypotheses can be 
derived considering the direction of this variation. According to the dual labour 
market theory, the part-time wage-gap is larger at the lower tail of the wage 
distribution as low-wage part-timers work in firms or jobs where accumulation of 
human capital is not rewarded (hypothesis 2a). In contrast, theory on quasi-fixed costs 
suggests that the part-time wage-gap is higher at the top of the wage distribution 
where fixed employment costs are higher (hypothesis 2b). 
4. Research method and data  
4.1. Dataset and description of main variables  
To explore the part-time wage penalty in Germany, the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (SOEP) is used (Wagner, Frick, & Schupp, 2007). To include also data from 
East-Germany, observations from the period 1991-2008 are analysed. Although there 
are differences between East- and West-Germany, this regional aspect is incorporated 
into the analysis to examine the developments in Germany after the reunification.  
The sample is restricted to workers between 18 and 55 years old. In 
accordance with OECD, part-time employment is defined as working 30 hours a week 
or less. The self-employed and the apprentices are excluded from the sample. 
Individuals working less than 10 hours weekly are omitted to exclude occasional 
workers with very low attachment to the labour market. After these corrections, the 
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average actual weekly working hours in our sample amount to 21.9 for part-timers 
and 42.7 for full-timers. 
The dependent variable in our analysis is the natural logarithm of the gross 
hourly wage. The hourly wage is calculated using the last month’s gross earnings 
from paid employment and the actual working time per week.  For years prior to 
2002, wages are transformed to euros. Wages are also adjusted with the Consumer 
Price Index.  Extreme values (the upper 30% of the 99th percentile and lowest 70% of 
the 1st percentile) of the hourly wage are dropped. Our final database consists of 
86,999 observations of which 72,761 (83.6%) refer to full-time workers and 14,238 
(16.4%) to part-time workers.   
Our list of control variables includes, gender, age, marital status, educational 
attainment, nationality, health status, the age of the youngest dependent child, firm 
size, occupation according to the 4-digit ISCO-88 classification, industrial sector, the 
type of the employment contract and dummies for East Germany, for having 
experienced an unemployment spell in the year prior to the survey and for having 
followed training in the year prior to the survey. Finally, we also include year 
dummies to control for the business cycle. Descriptive statistics of control variables in 
our sample are provided in table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4.2. Method 
Previous research as shown that the analysis of atypical employment can be sensitive 
to the estimation models (see, e.g. Mertens & McGinnity, 2005); especially, in the 
presence of differing quality of available jobs across the wage levels. Thus, to 
estimate the effect of part-time work across the wage distribution in Germany non-
parametric quantile regression approach is used (Koenker & Basset, 1978; Koenker & 
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D’Orey, 1987; Koenker & Hallock, 2001).1  The regression model of the wage yi for 
quintile θ can be expressed as: 
Qθ(yi|Xi) = α(θ)  +  Xiβθ,   θ ∈ (0,1) 
where the yi is the log hourly wage of the person i, Xi represents the vector of 
covariates and 𝑎, βθ are the coefficients to be estimated. Xi is perceived as a linear 
function of the covariates, while the model specifies the θthquantile of the conditional 
distribution of the log hourly wage. We obtain consistent standard errors by using 
pair-wise design-matrix bootstrap with 500 replications (see an overview of 
calculating the covariance matrixes M. Buchinsky, 1995; M.  Buchinsky, 1998).  
To exemplify further the differences between part-time and full-time workers, 
we apply a wage decomposition similar to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
(Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). The principle of this method is that the part-time wage 
gap is decomposed into a component that is due to the different composition of the 
two groups and a component that is related to the return to the characteristics of the 
two groups. As, in a quantile regression, the vectors of the explanatory variables and 
the individual error terms make the wage estimates conditional to the specific 
quantile, the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition cannot be applied. In recent 
years, Machado and Mata (2005) have proposed a decomposition procedure that 
incorporates bootstrap to quantile regression. This method is based in the probability 
integral transformation theory (Melly, 2005), which is used to estimate the wage 
density. Melly (2007) and Chernozhukov et al. (2009) proposed a modified procedure 
of Machado and Mata’s (2005) decomposition by estimating a quantile regression for 
a selected number of quantiles of the log wage. This procedure yields essentially the 
same results as the approach proposed by Machado and Mata, while not relying solely 
                                                     
1 The quintile regression treats the data as repeated cross sections. We would have preferred to use a comparable 
fixed-effects panel regression to estimate better the causal effect of part-time employment. However, this 
technique is at the moment nascent and suffers by many drawbacks, such as the limited number of covariates that 
can be used in the models. We tested the sensitivity of our results by restricting the analysis to a single cross 
section but this did not change the main findings of this study. Results are available at request. 
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on simulation-based estimation. According to this approach, the estimator of the 𝜃𝑡ℎ 
unconditional quantile (from j = 1, . . . , J) can be expressed as follows: 
𝑞(𝑋𝑖, 𝛽𝜃, 𝜃) = inf {𝑞 ∶  
1
𝑁 
 ∑ ∑(𝜃𝑗 −  𝜃𝑗−1)1 (𝑥𝑖𝛽𝜃𝑗 ≤ 𝑞) ≥
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝜃
𝑁
𝑖=1
} 
 where 1 is the indicator function. 
Afterwards, a counterfactual distribution of the wage gap is performed by replacing 
the estimated parameters of the distribution of characteristics of full-time workers 
with those of part-time workers. This can be noted as follows: 
𝑞(𝑋𝑖
𝑝, 𝛽𝑡, 𝜃) −  𝑞(𝑋𝑖
𝑓 , 𝛽𝑓 , 𝜃) =  [𝑞𝜃 (𝑥
𝑝, 𝛽𝜃
𝑝) −  𝑞𝜃 (𝑥
𝑝, 𝛽𝜃
𝑓)] 
                                                       + [𝑞𝜃 (𝑥
𝑝, 𝛽𝜃
𝑓) − 𝑞𝜃 (𝑥
𝑓 , 𝛽𝜃
𝑓)] 
                                                       + 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙   
where 𝑝 denotes part-time and 𝑓 fulltime. 
As shown in the last equation, at each quantile, the difference of the 
unconditional distributions can be divided into two components. The first component 
represents the difference in labour market characteristics of the two groups – the 
characteristics’ effect, while the second component represents the differences 
between the rewards that the two groups obtain from their labour market 
characteristics – the coefficients’ effect. Thus, the second component is the 
unexplained part of the part-time wage-gap for the specific quantile. The underlying 
assumption of this model is that the residual term disappears if the linear regression 
model is accurately specified and if we use a sufficiently-high number of simulations 
(Melly, 2005).  
In the aforementioned decomposition, any omitted variable or error in the 
measurement become part of the coefficients’ effect and increase the unexplained part 
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of the part-time wage gap. This is a well-known problem of the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition. However, this is less of a problem for the quintile counterfactual 
decomposition. The reason for this is that the quintile regression estimates the returns 
for the characteristics within each quantile separately, which improves the precision in 
the estimation of explained and unexplained component of the wage-gap (Gregory, 
2010). 
5. Results 
5.1. The effect of part-time work across the wage distribution 
As shown in table 1, the average hourly wage of a part-time worker in our sample is 
12.2 Euros while the full-time equivalent is 13.9 Euros. To get a smooth 
representation of the distributions of the hourly wage of part-time and full-time 
workers, kernel density estimates are plotted in figure 1. This graph illustrates that the 
wage distribution of full-timers is highly concentrated around the mode. In contrast, 
part-timers have a somewhat higher dispersion of their density function as well as 
several peaks. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The results of the pooled OLS and the quantile regressions are presented in 
table 2. The OLS regression shows that part-time workers receive on average a 5.7% 
lower wage than their full-time colleagues. This concurs with the findings of Fouarge 
and Muffels  (2009), who suggest that the part-time wage-gap in Germany is smaller 
than in other countries. However, the picture becomes different if we investigate the 
part-time wage-gap in the various part of the wage distribution. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Figure 2 gives a graphical illustration of the estimates for the part-time wage 
gap that are presented in Table 2. The estimated wage-gap is presented together with 
the 95% confidence interval. Figure 2 shows that, controlling for other covariates, a 
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decreasing wage-gap between part-timers and full-timers emerges when we move 
from the lowest to the highest conditional income quantiles. Actually, the wage 
penalty reverses into a small wage premium when we reach the top decile. In more 
detail, at the bottom of the distribution (10th percentile), the wage-gap is around 
16.8% to the disadvantage of part-time workers. The wage-gap presents the following 
trend as we move to higher deciles: -12.1% in the 20th percentile, -8.9% in the 30th, -
6.6% in the 40th, -4.8% in the median, -3.0% in the 60th and -1.8% in the 70th 
percentile. These results are in line with the 1st hypothesis: there is a significant part-
time wage penalty that varies considerably across the wage distribution after 
controlling for socio-economic and employment-related characteristics. In accordance 
with hypothesis 2a, the wage-gap disappears for part-timers at the higher wage 
quantiles: the wage-difference between full-timers and part-timers becomes not 
significant in the 80th percentile and increases to 3.4% to the benefit of the part-time 
workers in the 90th percentile).2 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 All in all, the results from the quantile regressions seem to favour more the 
segmentation theory than theory on the quasi-fixed costs. At the lower end of the 
wage distribution, part-time jobs may be characterised as ‘bad’ jobs or jobs belonging 
to the secondary labour market where skills’ accumulation is not rewarded 
(hypothesis 2a). The extent of the part-time wage-gap at the bottom of the distribution 
hints to the fact that in the highly segmented German labour market, low-wage part-
time workers are more easily marginalised and are typical ‘outsiders’. In contrast, in 
high-wage jobs, working part-time is not associated with a wage penalty, suggesting 
that in the primary segment of the labour market part-time jobs are not ‘bad jobs’. 
                                                     
2 The aforementioned results may be biased due to non-random selection into part-time employment. To 
investigate this selection into part-time work, we estimate an IV-quantile regression using the ability to start a new 
job as an instrument. Our instrumental variable strategy shows higher returns to part-time employment, especially 
in the lower end of the wage distribution. The size of these returns fluctuates across the distribution. However, our 
instrument is probably week as it has large standard errors. Thus, the endogeneity of part-time employment cannot 
be rejected. Unfortunately, the SOEP lacks suitable instrumental variables, especially data on individuals’ opinions 
that are considered optimal for such an IV-estimation.  
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We should stress here that contrary to previous studies that focussed on mean 
effects of part-time employment (Bardasi & Gornick, 2008; Manning & Petrongolo, 
2008), the estimated part-time wage-gap is not sensitive to occupational differences. 
Our models were also estimated without occupation as a covariate and no drastic 
change of the part-time wage-gap emerged. 3 
5.2. Counterfactual wage decomposition 
To further quantify and understand the wage-gap between part-time and full-time 
workers, a counterfactual wage decomposition is performed. The results of this 
decomposition are presented in table 3. The first column of this table presents the 
average (‘raw’) wage gap before controlling for other characteristics in every quintile. 
The second and the third column present the two effects that are estimated per quintile 
by the counterfactual wage decomposition: the characteristics’ effect and the 
coefficients’ effect. Table 3 indicates that not only the size of the part-time wage, but 
also its source differs across the various parts of the wage distribution. More 
specifically, at the very bottom of the distribution (10th percentile), the ‘raw’ wage-
penalty for part-time employment amounts to 3%. However, this relatively small 
wage-gap is the result of a large equalizing characteristics’ effect (11.7%) and an even 
larger diverging coefficients’ effect (-14.7%). It seems that part-time workers at the 
very bottom of the wage distribution have ‘better’ socio-economic and labour market 
characteristics compared to full-time workers in the same wage quantile. The reward 
to personal and job characteristics remains equally large (-13%) in the 20th percentile, 
while the equalizing characteristics’ effect disappears. As we move to higher deciles 
of the wage distribution, the characteristics’ effect becomes gradually more important 
(-4.3% to -12.7% from the 30th to 80th percentile of the wage distribution) and 
reinforces the wage gap in favour of the full-timers. In contrast, the coefficients’ 
effect, which indicates the possible existence of discrimination against the part-timers, 
becomes steadily smaller as we move from the bottom to the top of the distribution.  
                                                     
3 These estimation results are available on request.  
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Essentially, at the top quintile, the wage difference derived from the returns to labour-
market characteristics is non-existent.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
All in all, the wage decomposition shows that the different composition of 
part-timers and full-timers can explain a large part of the part-time wage gap in many 
parts of the wage distribution. In fact, at the top deciles, this different composition can 
almost fully explain the wage gap.  In contrast, the ‘residual’ wage gap that cannot be 
explained by the different composition of the two groups is mostly important at the 
bottom of the distribution and non-existent at the top of the distribution. 
A comment on the different direction and size of the two components at the 
various parts of the wage distribution is necessary. It seems that workers with 
characteristics that produce high wage returns are overrepresented among part-timers 
at the bottom of the distribution. This points to the role of individual preferences in 
labour-market participation. Several individuals with high-earnings potential value the 
possibility to work part-time more than earnings. However, these individuals pay a 
price for their choice as their characteristics are not equally remunerated compared to 
their full-time colleagues. The lower remuneration of characteristics reduces to almost 
zero as we move to the top deciles. Considering that a broad range of characteristics is 
included in the decomposition, this reinforces the conclusion that a part-time job is a 
‘bad’ job at the bottom of the distribution but not at the top of the distribution.  
5.3. Robustness checks 
In this section, we apply three robustness checks to investigate the validity of our 
main results. Firstly, we restrict our analysis to female workers. The reason is that 
part-time jobs are largely concentrated among women, as women use this form of 
employment to achieve their optimal work-life balance. Secondly, we use the full 
sample and distinguish between voluntary and involuntary part-time employment. 
Finally, we use again the full sample to study the effect of part-time employment 
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when accompanied by a job change. The main results of these robustness analyses are 
presented in table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 The quantile regression for women – regression 1 – shows that the main results 
of our analysis persist when we restrict our sample to female workers. A considerable 
wage-gap emerges at the lower quantiles that reduces as we move to the top quantiles. 
This wage-gap disappears when we look at the 7th quantile and turns into a wage 
premium at the highest quantile. The decomposition of the wage-gap4 shows that, at 
the lower wage quantiles, the socio-economic characteristics reduce considerably the 
wage-gap, while in the upper wage quantiles (from the 6th to the 9th quantile) the 
effect is not present. In contrast, the difference in the reward of the socio-economic 
characteristics (coefficients’ effect) increases the wage penalty for part-time employ-
ment at the lower quantiles while it is practically non-existent at the higher quantiles.  
The second part of Table 4 – regression 2 – presents the results from a quantile 
regression on the full sample where we distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
part-time employment. We define part-time employment as involuntary when the 
desired working hours of the respondent are higher than the actual working hours at 
the time of the survey. The results indicate that, at all quantiles, the wage penalty for 
part-time work is higher when part-time employment is involuntary. Moreover, for 
involuntary part-time employment, the differences in the wage penalty between the 
various quantiles are more pronounced. However, the overall pattern remains the 
same with our main results. 
The third and final part of table 4 – regression 4 – presents the results from a 
quantile regression on the full sample where part-time employment is interacted with 
a variable indicating whether the respondent has changed an employer or a job with 
the same employer in the year prior to the survey. The results indicate that the penalty 
for part-time employment is larger for workers that recently changed employers than 
                                                     
4 The results are available at request. 
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workers that remained in the same job. However, for workers that changed jobs in the 
same firm, the part-time wage-gap is the same as with the ones that remained in the 
same job. Once more, these results follow the same pattern with the results of our 
main analysis. 
6. Conclusions 
 This paper investigated the part-time wage gap in Germany by using the wage 
level as a proxy that captures a large part of the heterogeneity in part-time 
employment. By employing a quantile regression, we found that the part-time wage-
gap is larger in the lower part than in the higher part of the wage distribution. The 
counterfactual wage decomposition revealed that the source of the wage-gap differs 
also significantly between the bottom and the top of the wage distribution. At the 
bottom of the distribution, the part of the wage-gap that is due to differences in the 
returns of the socio-economic and job characteristics between part-time and full-time 
workers is dominant. In contrast, at the top of the distribution, the part time wage-gap 
is almost entirely produced by differences in the observed characteristics between 
part-timers and full-timers. Additional analysis showed that our main results are not 
sensitive to gender, the voluntary nature of part-time employment or a possible job 
change. However,  
This study confirms the heterogeneous nature of part-time employment. 
Employers offer part-time jobs to adjust to non-standard needs of output. However, 
their decision to ‘penalize’ part-timers with a lower wage depends on various factors. 
If the complexity and the structure of the job increase, the cost of using part-time 
employment increases accordingly. Sometimes, it may be just the perception of the 
employer about the job that matters. In a labour market where long-term standard 
employment relationships are valued, part-time contracts are offered for low-paid jobs 
that are less important for employers. For all these reasons, part-timers may receive a 
lower wage than their full-time colleagues. 
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 Workers accept part-time jobs according to their needs but also according to 
their preferences in order to achieve their optimal work-life balance and combine 
employment with other activities. The latter means that some workers may even 
accept a lower hourly wage provided that they can maintain their optimal number of 
working hours.  
Finally, demand for part-time work cannot always be considered exogenous. 
The increased willingness of workers to work part-time may induce firms to increase 
their demand for part-time employment as they think that, in this way, they will attract 
applicants with better skills.  
 Labour market regulation does not leave these processes unaffected. When the 
wage setting is regulated by law or collective bargaining, penalizing the part-timers 
with a lower wage is difficult. In a labour market where no statutory minimum wages 
exist and collective bargaining does not cover all firms, the heterogeneity that is 
produced by regulation is even larger. 
 Our results indicate that ignoring the differences between the various parts of 
the wage distribution and focussing on average effects that has been the dominant 
approach in the literature, conceals the very different function of part-time 
employment at the various strata of the wage distribution. Actually, explanations 
based on job quality seem to matter more in the determination of the part-time wage 
gap than the costs related to the use of part-time work. In theoretical terms, this means 
that we should derive explanations for the part-time wage gap from labour market 
segmentation theory and less from economic theory on quasi-fixed costs.  
Understanding the causes of the part-time wage-gap is also necessary to 
calibrate labour market policies that introduce more flexibility. Our results indicate 
that part-time employment is strongly related to the segmented nature of the German 
labour market. At the bottom of the distribution, part-time is considered as an inherent 
characteristic of a bad job, while at the top of the distribution part-time jobs are more 
likely to be good jobs. However, except for labour market segmentation, individual 
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preferences for work-life balance play an important role. More specifically, some 
individuals with high earnings potential seem to value other activities more than 
employment and they accept working in low-paid part-time jobs where they face a 
wage penalty compared to their full-time colleagues.    
From a policy perspective, the aforementioned findings suggest that Germany 
has to concentrate more on the risk groups and especially on the low-wage part-
timers. Thus, recent reforms in the German labour market towards flexibility and 
encouraging part-time work (that in effect may result in low-skilled work) could 
subsidise the locking into low-wage employment (see on this topic e.g. Kyrrä , 
Parrotta, & Rosholm, 2009; Van Ours, 2004). This could be an area in which 
regulation for labour protection could have an effect.  
This analysis should be refined with development of fixed effects quantile 
regression that will allow the further identification of the causal effects of part-time 
employment. As the current version of these methods does not allow the inclusion of 
many covariates, we left this as an issue for further research.   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
. 
Variables Categories Full-
time 
Part-
time 
Total 
  Mean (Std) or %  
Real gross hourly 
wage   
Cont. variable (Euros) 13.913 
(7.035) 
12.183 
(6.778) 
 
Nr  of children Cont. variable 0.518 
(0.850) 
0.733 
(0.908) 
 
Actual hours 
worked 
Cont. variable 42.755 
(5.519) 
21.847 
(6.117) 
 
Tenure  Cont. variable (years) 10.375 
(9.908) 
8.873 
(8.869) 
 
Sex Man (woman reference 
category) 
62.84%     8.81% 54.00% 
Married  Yes (no reference category) 57.54% 75.28% 60.45% 
Age of the 
youngest child  
No children (reference 
category)  
63.35% 46.76% 60.64% 
 Preschool(0-6)  12.08% 14.95% 12.55% 
 Pre-teens(7-12)  13.48% 22.36% 14.93% 
 Teenagers (13-16)  11.08% 15.94% 11.88% 
Education  
(based on ISCED 
codes: 6 (high), 3–5 
(medium), and 1–2 
(low))  
Low education  14.41% 13.92% 14.33% 
Medium education  63.05%       67.90%    63.84% 
High education (ref. 
category) 
22.54% 18.18% 21.82% 
Severely 
handicapped 
Yes (no reference category) 4.36% 3.95% 4.30% 
Nationality  Non-German (German 
reference category) 
9.28%        7.71%       9.03% 
Region East-Germany (West-
Germany reference 
category) 
29.50%       16.95%   27.45% 
Temporary 
contract  
Yes (permanent contract 
reference category) 
13.78% 12.22% 13.52% 
Received training 
prev.  year  
Yes (no reference category) 8.76% 1.79% 7.62% 
Unemployment 
experience (prev. 
year) 
Yes  (no reference category) 6.17% 6.55% 6.23% 
Firm-size (nr of 
employees) 
Micro firm (<20) 5.49% 12.65% 6.66% 
 Small firm (20-199)  45.92% 51.07% 46.77% 
 Medium firm  (200-1999) 23.99% 17.12% 22.86% 
 Large company (=>2000) 
(reference category) 
24.60% 19.16% 23.71% 
Sector  
 (based on NACE 
categorization) 
 
Primary sector  2.45% 2.09% 2.39% 
Secondary sector   39.74%    12.94% 35.35% 
Tertiary sector (service 
industry) 
34.22%  43.78% 35.78% 
 Public services (health, 
education and defence)  
(reference category) 
23.60% 41.18% 26.48% 
Occupation  
 (based on the 
Legislators, senior officials 
and managers (reference 
5.72% 1.11% 4.96% 
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highest categories 
of the ISCO-88 4-
digit occupational 
categorization) 
category)  
Professionals  15.82% 13.37% 15.42% 
Technicians and associate 
professionals  
22.62% 27.6% 23.43% 
Clerks  11.78% 19.98% 13.12% 
Service, sales and skilled 
agricultural workers  
9.32% 21.24% 11.27% 
Craft and trade workers  20.27% 2.62% 17.38% 
 Plant and machine operators  9.38% 2.02% 8.18% 
 Elementary occupations  5.1% 12.07% 6.24% 
Number of observations (N) 72,761 14,238 86,999 
Source: Authors, GSOEP sample of 1991-2008. 
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Table 2. Selection of estimates for OLS and quantile regressions (10th- 90th 
quantile (standard errors in parenthesis)) 
 
 
  
 
OLS Q.10 Q.20 Q.30 Q.40 Q.50 Q.60 Q.70 Q.80 Q.90 
Part-time (full-
time ref.) 
-0.059*** 
(0.007)                 
-0.184*** 
(0.01) 
-0.129*** 
(0.006)                 
-0.093*** 
(0.005) 
-0.068*** 
(0.004) 
-0.049*** 
(0.004) 
-0.030*** 
(0.004) 
-0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.033*** 
(0.006) 
Man (woman 
ref.) 
0.154*** 
(0.006)                 
0.156*** 
(0.005) 
0.142*** 
(0.004) 
0.139*** 
(0.003) 
0.140*** 
(0.003) 
0.141*** 
(0.003) 
0.146*** 
(0.003) 
0.148*** 
(0.003) 
0.154*** 
(0.004) 
0.171*** 
(0.004) 
Low education  -0.309*** 
(0.01)                 
-0.256*** 
(0.009) 
-0.256*** 
(0.006)                 
-0.262*** 
(0.005) 
-0.273*** 
(0.006) 
-0.276*** 
(0.005) 
-0.287*** 
(0.006) 
-0.297*** 
(0.006) 
-0.303*** 
(0.007) 
-0.324*** 
(0.008) 
Medium 
education  
-0.176***  
(0.008)                 
-0.149*** 
(0.007) 
-0.151*** 
(0.005)                 
-0.155*** 
(0.004) 
-0.163*** 
(0.004) 
-0.165*** 
(0.004) 
-0.167*** 
(0.004) 
-0.176*** 
(0.005) 
-0.186*** 
(0.005) 
-0.207*** 
(0.006) 
Temp. contract 
(permanent ref.) 
-0.299*** 
(0.007)                 
-0.473*** 
(0.017) 
-0.353*** 
(0.01)                 
-0.291*** 
(0.01) 
-0.272*** 
(0.008) 
-0.263*** 
(0.007) 
-0.246*** 
(0.006) 
-0.228*** 
(0.006) 
-0.199*** 
(0.006) 
-0.162*** 
(0.007) 
Region (W-G. 
ref.) 
-0.275*** 
(0.006)                 
-0.315*** 
(0.005) 
-0.309*** 
(0.004)                 
-0.300*** 
(0.003) 
-0.287*** 
(0.003) 
-0.277*** 
(0.003) 
-0.268*** 
(0.003) 
-0.266*** 
(0.003) 
-0.256*** 
(0.003) 
-0.241*** 
(0.004) 
Primary sector -0.109*** 
(0.015)                 
-0.169*** 
(0.017) 
-0.133*** 
(0.011)                 
-0.121*** 
(0.01) 
-0.122*** 
(0.009) 
-0.109*** 
(0.009) 
-0.087*** 
(0.009) 
-0.083*** 
(0.009) 
-0.070*** 
(0.01) 
-0.034 
(0.014) 
Secondary sector 0.027*** 
(0.006)                 
0.013 
(0.007) 
0.018*** 
(0.005)                 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
0.027*** 
(0.004) 
0.033*** 
(0.003) 
0.042*** 
(0.004) 
0.049*** 
(0.004) 
0.058*** 
(0.004) 
0.068*** 
(0.006) 
Tertiary sector -0.046*** 
(0.006)                 
-0.090*** 
(0.006) 
-0.078*** 
(0.004) 
-0.064*** 
(0.003) 
-0.056*** 
(0.003) 
-0.047*** 
(0.003) 
-0.031*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.026*** 
(0.005) 
Constant 
2.047*** 
(0.036)                 
1.512*** 
(0.063) 
1.838*** 
(0.041) 
1.993*** 
(0.035) 
2.084*** 
(0.03) 
2.140*** 
(0.031) 
2.218*** 
(0.029)  
2.320*** 
(0.032)           
2.474*** 
(0.035)  
2.751*** 
(0.034)  
 R2 (OLS)/Pseudo 
R2 (QR) 0.6312 0.479 0.449 0.427 0.408 0.392 0.379 0.368 0.360 0.351 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01,*** p<0.001                                           
Additional control variables in the model were age, marital status, nationality, health status, the age of the youngest dependent child, firm size, occupation, 
unemployment experience and training and control for business cycles. 
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Table 3. Decomposition of part-time wage-gap based on the conditional model 
 Raw wage-gap 
(Std.) 
Characteristics 
effect (Std.) 
Coefficients 
effect (Sdt.) 
Q.10 -0.030 
(0.010) 
0.117 
(0.008) 
-0.147 
(0.009) 
Q.20 -0.129 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.130 
(0.006) 
Q.30 -0.150 
(0.005) 
-0.042 
(0.004) 
-0.109 
(0.005) 
Q.40 -0.155 
(0.004) 
-0.065 
(0.003) 
-0.090 
(0.005) 
Q.50 -0.155 
(0.004) 
-0.081 
(0.003) 
-0.074 
(0.004) 
Q.60 -0.153 
(0.005) 
-0.093 
(0.003) 
-0.060 
(0.004) 
Q.70 -0.151 
(0.005) 
-0.104 
(0.003) 
-0.046 
(0.004) 
Q.80 -0.149 
(0.005) 
-0.119 
(0.004) 
-0.030 
(0.004) 
Q.90 -0.137 
(0.007) 
-0.143 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
No. of obs. in the reference group 72761           
No. of obs. in the counterfactual group   14238 
 
 
  
  
Table 4. Additional robustness checks  
 
Q.10 Q.20 Q.30 Q.40 Q.50 Q.60 Q.70 Q.80 Q.90
Part-time (full-time ref,) -0,106*** -0,070*** -0,046*** -0,030*** -0,020*** -0,006*** -0,001 0,005 0,022*
Part-time (full-time ref,) -0,137*** -0,100*** -0,069*** -0,050*** -0,030*** -0,018*** -0,008 0,001 0,036**
Involuntary (working as 
many hours or more as 
preferred ref.)
0,029* 0,021 0,015 0,011 0,009 0,009 0,002 0,002 0,002**
Involuntary x part-time -0,155*** -0,110*** -0,089*** -0,070*** -0,070*** -0,053*** -0,035*** -0,023* -0,020
Part-time (full-time ref,) -0,161*** -0,110*** -0,078*** -0,060*** -0,040*** -0,022*** -0,012 0,003 0,039
Job change new employer 
(no change ref.)
0,014** 0,033*** 0,040*** 0,050*** 0,059*** 0,062*** 0,064*** 0,060*** 0,060***
Job change old employer, 
new job (no change ref.)
-0,044** 0,011 0,009 0,018*** 0,024*** 0,030*** 0,031*** 0,041*** 0,046
Part-time x job change,  new 
employer 
-0,126*** -0,120*** -0,082*** -0,070*** -0,060*** -0,038* -0,031*** -0,023* -0,030
Part-time x job change new 
job, same employer 
0,089 0,043 0,066** 0,036 0,021 0,002 -0,012*** -0,024 0,000
Additional control variables in the model were gender, education, region, temporary contract, age, marital status, nationality, health status, the age of the
youngest dependent child, firm size, occupation, unemployment experience and training and control for business cycles.Source: Authors; GSOEP sample of 1991-2008.
Regression 1. (women-only sample)
Regression 2. (full sample)
Part-time work interaction with working under preferred number of hours (involuntary)
Regression 3. (full sample)
Job change added to the full sample + interaction with part-time quantile regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01,*** p<0.001                                          
  
Figure 1. Kernel density function estimates for the real gross hourly wage of 
part-time and full-time workers 
 
   Source: Own calculation from GSOEP sample of 1991-2008. 
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Figure 2. Asymptotic 95% Confidence Interval of quantile regression estimates 
for part-time employment (controlled for other covariates)* 
 
*The dashed line depicts the OLS estimate. 
Source: own calculations from GSOEP sample of 1991-2008. 
